







1. Does the European Union possess a constitution? 
1.1. Perspectivism of legal disciplines and legal orders 
 
 Much ink – too much, one could say – has been spilled in debating whether the EU possesses a 
constitution or not. This is not an issue where an objectively valid answer could be found. What 
is at stake is the basic legal vocabulary with which the EU is characterized. Alternative conceptual 
frameworks exist. More or less convincing arguments can be presented in favour of opting for 
each of these, but no second-order criteria exist for declaring any of them the winner of the 
argumentative game. 
 Alternative conceptual frameworks reflect, not only to the scholarly disagreements and 
individual efforts to stand out in scholarly debates, but also a more profound and interesting 
backdrop; namely, the perspectivism which labels law in general but which is especially 
accentuated in the context of the EU. We always approach the law from a particular perspective, 
and our perspective inevitably affects the legal cultural Vorverständnis (pre-understanding) 
through which our legal knowledge is filtered. Legal concepts form a central part of this 
Vorverständnis.  Legal cultural perspectivism comes in three main guises: perspectivism of legal 
disciplines, legal orders and legal roles. Here we can focus on the perspectivism of legal 
disciplines and legal orders and skip that of legal roles, manifesting the different relations to law 
of, say, judges, scholars and legislators.  
Different legal disciplines employ different legal concepts and offer different 
conceptualizations of “surface-level” legal phenomena; say, the Founding Treaties of the EU in. 
A constitutional lawyer may see in the Treaties a (formal) constitution – or, at least, a quasi-
constitution; an administrative lawyer a delegation of administrative powers from the Member 
States to the EU; and an international lawyer an international treaty establishing an international 
organization. Such disciplinary perspectives are not wholly exclusive. In her account, a 
constitutional lawyer may find space even for administrative and international law aspects; an 
administrative lawyer for constitutional and international law viewpoints; and an international 
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lawyer for constitutional and administrative law considerations. However, the main disciplinary 
perspective dictates the emphasis in the account and the legal vocabulary employed.  
Yet, not only do disciplinary commitments affect our conceptual choices. Legal 
phenomena are always analysed in relation to a distinct legal order; a referential legal order, as 
we can call it. Especially when analysing legal phenomena which lie in the intersection of several 
legal orders – as does the EU – the conscious or unconscious choice of the referential legal order 
is of crucial importance. Obviously, the basic choice here is between the EU legal order and a 
Member State legal order. Evidently, conceptual frameworks which lead to negating or at least 
downplaying European-level constitutionalism, such as an administrative or international law 
approach, imply commitment to the latter, Member State perspective. Within the constitutional 
approach both the EU law and a Member State law perspective are possible. This has been made 
conspicuous by fundamental conflicts of authority between the ECJ and, say, the German 
Constitutional Court. Both courts employ a constitutional approach, but the ECJ examines the 
issue at stake from the perspective of EU constitutional law, while the German Court adopts the 
perspective of German constitutional law. Still, the perspectivism of legal order is not exhausted 
merely by the choice of the surface-level constitutional norms which are deemed applicable to 
the issue at hand. Legal orders do not consist merely of surface-level norms but include legal 
cultural layers, informing the Vorverständnis of legal actors. This also holds for constitutional 
law: constitutional culture, consisting of constitutional concepts, principles, theories and methods, 
possesses features specific to the respective legal order at issue.  
In sum, when examining the debates on European constitutionalism we should be 
attentive to the perspectivism of both legal disciplines and legal orders. Commitment to a 
constitutional law approach does not necessarily imply acknowledgement of European 
constitutionalism. When the constitutional law approach is combined with the perspective of 
Member State law, rejection of the constitutional claim of European law is wholly conceivable, 
perhaps even probable. To speak of European constitutionalism requires a combination of 
constitutional law and European law perspectives. Such a combination defines the legal cultural 
starting-point of this Chapter. 
Emphasizing the significance of legal cultural perspectivism does not imply 
immunizing scholarly arguments from criticism anchored in another perspective or negating the 
possibility of a wide divergence of views within each perspective. Thus, adopting the combination 
of constitutional law and European law perspectives does not exclude disagreements with other 
accounts sharing the same perspectival commitments. Indeed, because of the still emergent and 
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contested nature of EU law culture, including EU constitutional culture, theoretical controversies 
are rather to be expected. 
 
1.2. The persistence of the state template  
 
Modern constitutionalism in both senses of the term, i.e. as specific constitutional practices and 
as the specific ideational basis of these practices, emerged in the context of modern states, to 
constitute, organize and delimit public power as state power. Constitutional concepts, starting 
from the very concept of constitution, bear traces if their origin. When transferred to the 
transnational level, to examine, say, the EU, we face the dilemma of translatability. On the one 
hand, concepts elaborated in the state setting offer the only available starting-point for 
transnational constitutional analysis. Furthermore, if national and transnational constitutionalism 
had nothing in common, it would be difficult to justify in the first place employing constitutional 
vocabulary at the transnational level. On the other hand, our conceptual framework should allow 
for the possibility that some typical features of national constitutionalism1 are wanting at the 
transnational level and that at this level constitutionalism displays aspects which do not find 
correspondence in the state setting. We should avoid thick concepts which may be warranted at 
the level of national constitutionalism but which tend to negate transnational constitutionalism or 
at least obscure the view to its particularities.  
Scholars who reject transnational European constitutionalism or denigrate it to the 
status of quasi-constitutionalism employ a thick notion of constitutionalism, manifesting the state 
template. In the administrative law account of the EU, represented most prominently by Peter 
Lindseth,2 constitutionalism is located exclusively at the pole of Member States, while the 
relationship between Member States and the EU is explored through the (US) administrative law 
conceptual relationship of delegation and control between a principal and an agent. In this 
analysis, constitutionalism does play an important role but at issue is the polyarchic 
constitutionalism of the Member states; at the level of the EU, nothing worth the term of 
constitutionalism exists.  
The administrative law account implies a thick normative notion of constitutionalism 
corresponding to the American understanding of a constitutional democracy and the European 
understanding of a democratic Rechtsstaat defined through the requirements of democracy and 
																																																						
1 In this Chapter, ‘national constitutionalism’ and ‘state constitutionalism’ are used as synonyms. 
2 P. Lindseth (2010). 
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fundamental rights. In this conceptual setting, ‘constitutionalism’ is intimately linked to 
legitimacy: ‘constitutionalism’ implies that the legitimacy of a polity and its law should be 
achieved through democratic procedures and fundamental rights. While Lindseth refuses to 
examine putative European constitutionalism in its interaction with national constitutionalism, he 
ends up by denying the justification for a constitutional depiction of the Union and its law. 3 
Dieter Grimm’s writings4 offer another example of adoption of a state perspective – in 
Grimm’s case, the perspective of German constitutional law; reliance on a thick definition of 
basic constitutional concepts; and a consequent scepticism of the constitutional credentials of the 
EU. Grimm defines modern constitution through five characteristics. 1. A constitution consists of 
legal norms and not of philosophic principles or a description of the actual power relationships in 
a polity. 2. Constitutional norms address the establishment and exercise of political rule (public 
power). It not only regulates and modifies public power but constitutes it. 3. The constitution 
regulates political rule in a systematic, comprehensive manner, tolerating neither 
extraconstitutional powers nor extraconstitutional ways and means of rule. Historically, the 
emergence of a modern constitution was preceded by the emergence of the modern state; i.e. the 
concentration of the rights to rule into a state power as a uniform public power. 4. Political rule 
is only legitimate when constituted and limited by the constitution, and consequently 
constitutional law takes precedence over all other legal acts, which are valid only when they 
comply with the constitutional framework. 5. Constitutional norms must originate with the 
people, since every other principle for the legitimation of political rule would undermine the other 
elements of a modern constitution and prevail over the constitution in the event of a conflict.  
Grimm emphasizes the significance for modern constitutionalism of the distinction 
between constituent and constituted power (pouvoir constituant and pouvoir constitué), made 
famous by abbé Siéyes: the constituent, constitution-making power lies with the people, while the 
bodies established by the constitution exercise constituted power. Closely related to the 
distinction between constituent and constituted power is another distinction; namely, that between 
procedures and principles of political decision-making and political decision-making itself. The 
procedures and principles of political decision-making fall under constituent power and belongs 
to the domain of the constitution, while political decision-making itself should be left to the 
																																																						
3 D. Halberstam (2009, 2010 and 2102), another American observer of putative European constitutionalism, identifies 
constitutionalism with limited self-governance.  
4 Two volumes of Grimm’s writings in constitutional law have recently appeared in English. D. Grimm (2016 and 
(2017). 
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constituted power; i.e. to the bodies established by the constitution. Grimm does not explicitly 
mention democracy and fundamental rights – the main elements of a constitutional democracy or 
a democratic Rechtsstaat – as conceptual elements of a constitution but labels them achievements 
or standards of modern constitutionalism. 
In Grimm’s assessment, the Founding Treaties of the EU fall short of the criteria of a 
modern constitution mainly because of the lack a democratic pouvoir constituant as their source. 
The Treaties are treaties under international law which have been ratified in accordance with 
national constitutional requirements and which cannot be amended without the consent of the 
Member States. The Member States remain Masters of the Treaties. They may enjoy democratic 
legitimacy in individual Member States but they are not emanations of the sovereignty, i.e. the 
constituent power, of a European people. If the term ‘constituent power’ can in general be used 
in the European context, the constituent power falls to the Member States and not to the European 
people. Grimm concedes that a process of constitutionalization has occurred in the sense that in 
particular in the jurisprudence of the ECJ, the Treaties have been assigned constitutional functions 
and treated as “higher law”. Grimm invokes the introduction of the direct effect of European law 
in van Gend en Loos and the principle of the supremacy of European law in Costa v Enel, as well 
as the extension of supremacy to cover even national constitutional law in Internationale 
Handelsgesellschaft. 5  However, these developments have not transformed the Treaties into a 
constitution in the full sense of the term; at most, the Treaties deserve the denomination of a quasi-
constitution. The minimum requirement for reaching the rank of a constitution would be the 
detachment of future Treaty amendments from the acceptance of the Member States; i.e. the 
abolishment of the Member States’ position as Masters of the Treaties. 
In Grimm’s view, the EU’s quasi-constitution also falls short of the achievements of 
modern constitutionalism, especially democracy. In line with many other observers, Grimm 
points to the legal, sociological and cultural obstacles to the development of the European 
parliament to a body representative of the European demos. However, he sees the main 
impediment to European level democracy in the violation of the crucial distinction between the 
conditions and the substance of political decision-making. The Treaties as a quasi-constitution do 
not regulate merely the procedure and principles of political decision-making but include 
substantive policy provisions in, for instance, competition law. The Treaties spill over to policy 
																																																						
5 Case C-26/62  Van Gend en Loos [1963] ECR 3; Case C-6/64 Flaminio Costa v ENEL [1964] ECR 585; Case C-11/70 
Internationale Handelsgesellschaft [1970] ECR 1125, 
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issues which at the state level belong to the domain of ordinary laws and ordinary democratic 
decision-making. In this sense, constitutionalization of the Treaties has led to over-
constitutionalization: to the narrowing of the field of political decision-making by the Council 
and the European Parliament, and the enhancement of the role of judicial decision-making by the 
Court and executive decision-making by the Commission. Constitutionalization has not been 
accompanied by a restriction of the substantive scope of the Treaties to issues of constitutional 
character.  
Thick concepts of constitution and constitutionalism, such as those employed by Lindseth and 
Grimm, reflect the persistent dominance of the state template of constitutions and hence risk 
blocking the view to the specificity of European constitutionalism. This specificity comprises 
extension of constitutionalism to sectoral policy fields, its process-like, evolutionary nature and 
its constant interaction with national, Member State constitutionalism. The state template focuses 
on the juridical and political constitutions, and tends to neglect sectoral constitutions, a distinct 
feature of European constitutionalism which corresponds to the basic teleological, policy 
orientation of European law. Rather than seeing in sectoral constitutionalization an anomaly it 
should be treated as a particularity of European constitutionalism, distinguishing it from its state 
counterpart. In addition to the framing juridical and political constitutions, in the EU 
constitutionalization has covered policy fields, such as economy, social welfare and security.  
Obsession with the concept of pouvoir constituant, labelling Grimm’s contributions, leads 
easily to downplaying the process-like character of the European constitution and ignoring he 
centrality of evolutionary concepts for its examination. Finally, rejecting the existence of 
constitutionalism at the European level because of the putative failure to meet the legitimacy 
exigencies of a constitutional democracy intimates bypassing the constant interaction with 
Member State constitutionalism; i.e. the third distinctive feature of European constitutionalism. 
In order to probe into the specificity of European constitutionalism, we should not burden our 
basic constitutional concepts with too demanding normative assumptions. ‘Constitution’ and 
‘constitutionalism’ can and should also be used in a thinner, normatively more neutral sense, 
which detaches them from the state template and allow for examining the particularities which 
mark out European constitutionalism. Yet, of course, we must also keep in mind that in order to 
justify the use of constitutional vocabulary in the first place, European constitutionalism must be 
shown to display, not only divergences from, but also similarities to state constitutionalism. 
Similarities similarities include the position of constitution as higher law and the basic functions 
this higher law is expected to perform. 
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1.3. Constitution as higher law 
The idea of constitution as higher law can be given both a formal and a substantive reading. Ever 
since the Les Verts ruling in 1986,6 the ECJ has characterized the Founding Treaties as the 
constitutional charter of the EC (the EU), implying that these amount to a formal constitution. 
The ECJ’s claim of the Treaties as a constitutional charter obviously involves the idea of higher 
or superior law. But superior to what law? One of the constitutional particularities of the EU is 
that superiority works in two directions: with regard to other EU law and with regard to the 
national law of the Member States. In the internal relations of EU law, the Treaties both enjoy 
primacy in norm conflicts and provide the competence basis for lower-level normative acts, such 
as regulations and directives. This corresponds to how Hans Kelsen, for instance, defined the 
superiority of the constitution in his hierarchical view of the legal order.7  
With regard to Member State law, superiority is a more complicated issue and breaks 
with the clarity and unambiguity of Kelsen’s conception. The superiority of EU law is reflected 
by the principle of supremacy of which the primacy of EU law over national Member State law 
in norm conflicts before national courts is a sub-principle. However, only directly effective Treaty 
norms enjoy primacy over conflicting national norms, but, to further complicate matters, so do 
other directly effective European norms, too, regardless of their position in the internal hierarchy 
of EU law. Moreover, the other characteristic of superiority which Kelsen attached to the 
hierarchical structure of law is wholly missing in relations between European and national law: 
EU law is not the basis of national law’s validity. In sum, EU law and national law do not 
constitute a unitary hierarchical structure or Stufenbau as the application of Kelsen’s ideas of 
constitutional superiority would require.  
As regards a qualified amendment procedure as a formal criterion of the superiority of 
constitutional law, the Treaties clearly stand out from other EU law. The Treaty on the European 
Union sets out a particular drafting and decision-making procedure for Treaty revisions. 
Moreover, as amendments to international treaties revisions have to be ratified by every Member 
State in accordance with the national constitution. Those sceptical of the constitutional claims of 
the EU are prone to emphasize that the Treaties remain part of international law and the Member 
States Masters of the Treaties. According to the tenets of an either-or logic, the Treaties cannot 
																																																						
6 Case C-294/83 Parti Ecologiste 'Les Verts' v Parliament [1986] ECR 1365. 
7 H, Kelsen (1989). 
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possess both an international law and a constitutional character. Yet dichotomous thinking may 
be misleading. Why could the Treaties not both obey international law in their amendment 
procedures and function as constitutional law with respect to other EU law and Member State 
national law? Kelsen, for one, did not see any difficulty in an international treaty functioning as 
the constitution of a legal order.8 
What further complicates labelling the Treaties as a formal constitution is the role of 
general principles in EU constitutional law. Some of the most pertinent constitutional principles 
are not enshrined in the Treaties but have been articulated in the case law of the ECJ; these include 
supremacy and direct effect, as well as efficacy (effet utile) and uniformity as meta-level 
justificatory principles. Initially, fundamental rights, too, were introduced into EU law as general 
principles through ECJ jurisprudence. The ECJ has expressly granted general principles 
constitutional status.9  Thus, even if the Treaties as a constitutional charter were characterized as 
a formal constitution, it is crucial to remember that not all constitutional norms are enshrined in 
explicit Treaty provisions. 
The ECJ is a hybrid court with many functions, reflecting the hybrid character of the 
EU legal system and polity. 10 It is not a mere constitutional court, but among its many tasks it 
does exercise functions which equal those of state constitutional courts: through judicial review, 
it guards the EU constitution as a higher law with regard to both lower-level EU law and national 
Member State law; it engages in protection of fundamental rights; it resolves conflicts of 
competence between the EU and the Member States in a way reminiscent of the role of a 
constitutional court in a federal state; and it settles disputes among the main EU institutions, such 
as the European Parliament, the Council and the Commission. Indeed, these functions of the ECJ 
are a major argument for applying constitutional concepts to the European level. 
 A typical vagueness can be observed in the formal contours of the EU constitution, 
brought about by the central role of the ECJ. A similar ambiguity affects the substance of this 
constitution in all its diverse dimensions; i.e. the substantive reading of the European constitution 
as higher law. The premise, however, should be clear enough: time and again, we are dealing with 
a loi fondamentale, a law of the basics, whether the juridical, political, economic, social or 
security constitution is at issue. These basics can be identified only through reconstructing the 
cultural or theoretical layers underlying “surface-level” Treaty law and doctrine. Yet, in its “sub-
surface” movement, too, European constitutionalism differs from typical state constitutionalism.  
																																																						
8 H. Kelsen (1920), p. 194. See also the discussion in R. Schütze (2009), pp. 37-9. 
9 Case C-101/08 Audiolux and Others v Groupe Bruxelles Lambert and Others [2009] ECR I-9823, Para. 63. 
10 R. Dehousse (1998) analyses the ECJ as an international, constitutional and administrative court. 
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 In the state setting, legal cultural principles, which also produce the substantive 
coherence of the legal order, are typically closer to Ronald Dworkin’s morally laden principles – 
principles in sensu stricto – than policies related to goals and programmes concerning the desired 
state of society.11 What has detached European law from an ideal typical state legal order is its 
fundamental policy orientation which has left its impact on constitutional law, too. The policy 
orientation is most conspicuous in sectoral constitutions, but it has affected juridical 
constitutionalization as well. Such key principles of the juridical constitution as direct effect and 
supremacy were also motivated by policy considerations; by the effective and uniform application 
of European law which aimed at the establishment and functioning of the common market.  
Accordingly, the substantive coherence which European law has achieved has been a 
result of policies rather than principles. However, building up sub-surface, legal-cultural 
foundations for policy-oriented law, including constitutional law, has been an arduous process. 
Within sectoral constitutions, Member State constitutional traditions can offer but meagre support 
for the development of EU constitutional culture. In central fields, EU law, comprising 
constitutional law too, has started cultural sedimentation from scratch: no national free movement 
law exists, and even national competition law is a relative newcomer.  
In their sub-surface foundations, the juridical and political dimensions partly differ from 
the general picture. General policy orientation affects the European framing constitutions, too, as 
is shown by the backdrop to direct effect and supremacy, and the justificatory principles of 
efficacy and uniformity. Yet an important sub-field of the juridical and political constitutions 
exists which EU constitutional law shares with its national counterparts, where national 
constitutional traditions have been an important source and where morally laden principles temper 
the policy emphasis; namely, fundamental rights law. Maastricht enshrined in Treaty law the 
contribution of national constitutional traditions to fundamental rights as general principles of 
European law.12 In respect of fundamental rights law, it is also evident that EU and national legal 
systems share the same “deep culture” where the universalist values now listed in Art. 2 TEU find 
their place.13 
																																																						
11 R. Dworkin (1978). 
12 Present Art. 6(3) TEU provides that “fundamental rights, as guaranteed by the European Convention for the Protection 
of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms and as they result from the constitutional traditions common to the Member 
States, shall constitute general principles of the Union's law”. In the Preamble to the TEU, the Member States confirm 
“their attachment to the principles of liberty, democracy and respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms and of 
the rule of law”. 
13 “The Union is founded on the values of respect for human dignity, freedom, democracy, equality, the rule of law and 
respect for human rights, including the rights of persons belonging to minorities. These values are common to the Member 




1.4. Constitutional functions 
 
The functions the European constitution is expected to accomplish should be examined in a 
differentiated manner, attending to the specific features of distinct constitutional dimensions. 
The functions of the sectoral constitutions are not necessarily identical to those of the framing 
political and juridical constitutions. Constitutional functions must primarily be examined in the 
relationship of constitutional law and its object of regulation; i.e. the juridical and political 
subsystems for the framing constitutions and specific policy fields for the sectoral ones.  
However, as even the term ‘framing constitution’ intimates, the juridical and political 
constitutions accomplish important functions with regard to, not only their specific 
constitutional objects, but also the other, i.e. sectoral, constitutional dimensions.  Thus, they 
provide the necessary legal and institutional means without which sectoral constitutionalization 
would not be possible. In particular through their fundamental rights part, they also play a 
restrictive role with regard to the sectoral ones.  
The functions constitutions are expected to fulfil at both the national and transnational 
level can be discussed in the following framework:  
 
- a constitutive function: bringing about the constitutional object;  
- a positioning function: defining the position of the constitutional object in relation to other 
entities of the same kind; 
- an organizing function: bringing order and stability into the constitutional object; 
- a restrictive function: preventing the constitutional object from exceeding its limits;  
- a legitimizing function: promoting the acceptance of the constitutional object among relevant 
addressees.  
 
In the EU, the above functions can be discerned in both framing and sectoral constitutions. In the 
following, examples will be taken from the European political constitution. Analogously to 
typical state constitutions, it has fulfilled a constitutive function in respect of European polity. 
The institutional part of the political constitution defines the main institutions of the EU, as well 
as their competences and mutual relationships. The constitution is also supposed to render the 
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institutional organization the order and stability necessary for its effective and frictionless 
operating. In a polity aspiring to meet the criteria of a democratic Rechtsstaat, the constitutive 
and organizing functions are accompanied by a restrictive one. Through fundamental rights, the 
constitution restricts the power that the institutions of the polity are allowed to wield with regard 
to individuals. Fundamental rights are not the only constitutional limitation on the powers of EU 
institutions. As a transnational, policy-oriented polity and differing from states, the EU does not 
possess a universal scope of activity, but its competences are limited to the substantive fields 
defined in the Treaties.  The principle of conferral is an essential restrictive principle of the EU 
political constitution, distinguishing it from its Member States where the principle of 
comprehensive powers reflects the universality of a sovereign state’s claim to political authority.  
A political constitution defines the individual pole of the polity as citizens, endowed 
with citizenship rights, among which fundamental rights possess a privileged position. From the 
perspective of individuals, fundamental rights protect them against abuse of power by the 
institutional pole of the polity and guarantee them spheres of private and public autonomy. The 
exercise by citizens of their public autonomy renders a polity its democratic character.  
In a nascent polity, such as the European one, the constitutive function should be 
examined in even broader, foundational terms. The political constitution is expected to contribute 
to the emergence of the polity itself, i.e. to accomplish a polity building function. For polity 
building, establishing and stabilizing the institutional organization and relating it to the individual 
pole of citizens does not suffice. Individual citizens should be interlinked as a citizenry; a demos 
capable of engendering the communicative power without which democracy would remain an 
empty promise of the formal constitution. Here the constitutional practices where European 
citizens jointly, across national borders, exercise their political autonomy are of crucial 
importance; it is only through these practices that European belongingness and solidarity or a 
European civil society and public sphere can develop. In polity building, the emergence of a 
constitutional culture shared by European legal or political elites does not suffice. What is needed 
is a civic constitutional culture forging individual citizens into a European citizenry; a source of 
communicative power controlling European political institutions and infusing them with 
democratic input legitimacy. As is well-known from the intensive debate of the EU’s democratic 
deficit, the European polity-building process is only taking its first steps. 
The constitutive function, so important for the political constitution of an emergent 
European polity, is accompanied by an equally important positioning function: defining the 
relations of the polity to other polities. This is a function of state constitutions, too, but it is 
particularly pertinent in a transnational polity, such as the EU. The basic positioning relates to the 
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claim to autonomy that a constitution typically involves. Discussing the relevance of the claim to 
autonomy takes us back to the overall characterization of the EU and its law. Opting for the 
language of transnational constitutionalism entails attaching to the European constitution a claim 
to autonomy as well. Through this claim, the European political constitution distinguishes the EU 
polity from Member States and international organizations under public international law.  
The organizational and restrictive functions are inseparable from the legitimizing one. 
For individuals, the political constitution of a democratic Rechtsstaat promises autonomy, 
citizenship and democracy. These promises are linked to the claim to legitimacy, so intimately 
associated with constitutionalism in its thick normative sense. The legitimizing function takes us 
to the constant interaction which EU constitutionalism maintains with national Member State 
constitutionalism; i.e. one of the distinctive features of EU constitutionalism. This interaction will 
be discussed in the last section of this Chapter.  
 
2. Multidimensionality of the European constitution 
 
As the “constitutional charter” of the EU, the Founding Treaties are bewildering reading for 
someone approaching them through the state template. Indeed, the general embarrassment among 
the citizenry confronted with the substance of the abortive Constitutional Treaty in the mid-2000s 
has been identified as one of the reasons for its rejection in the French and Dutch referenda. The 
Treaties contain an abundance of provisions which do not pertain to typical materia constitutionis 
of state constitutions; most conspicuously provisions on diverse policy fields. The European 
constitution is not only about European law and polity; it is also about European economy, 
European social welfare and European security. For scholars adopting the perspective and 
standards of state constitutionalism, such as Dieter Grimm, policy-related provisions blur the 
boundary which distinguishes principles and procedures of politics from its substance and which 
also should delimit constitutional from ordinary law. Such provisions are seen as an anomaly 
which attests to the quasi-nature of the European constitution and which should be removed.  
State constitutions usually limit themselves to regulating the political and legal sub-
systems of society. The political and juridical dimensions exist in the European constitution as 
well. In the political dimension, constitutional law regulates the EU as a polity and in the juridical 
dimension the EU legal system. But EU constitutional law also constitutionalizes sectoral fields 
which at state level are usually the province of ordinary policy- and law-making. In state 
constitutions, the basic premise is the universality of the political and legal claim to authority 
within state territory; the principle of comprehensive powers, as we can also put it. State 
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constitutions follow a territorial principle of authority, and, consequently, no sector-specific 
constitutional authorizations are needed. By contrast, the European Union does not adhere to a 
territorial but to a functional or substantive principle of authority. In accordance with the basic 
policy orientation of the EU, its juridical and political claim to authority is substantially 
(functionally) limited. Neither is the assumption of comprehensive powers valid for the European 
transnational polity and legal system; the principle of conferral substitutes for that of 
comprehensive powers. Not only must the European constitution provide the general juridical and 
political framework for sectoral policies; it must also set sectoral objectives and create sectoral 
competences. Consequently. the framing political and juridical constitutions are complemented 
by sectoral constitutions, such as economic, social and security constitutions. Furthermore, 
economic constitutionalization has produced a differentiation of two subfields: a microeconomic 
constitution, based on the Treaty of Rome but in important respects elaborated by the ECJ, and a 
macroeconomic one, based on the Maastricht provisions on Economic and Monetary Union 
(EMU). The microeconomic constitution is centred around free movement and competition law, 
and focuses on the economic activity of individual economic actors. In turn, the macroeconomic 
constitution addresses macroeconomic objectives and policies. 
The sectoral constitutions possess distinct constitutional objects: European economy, social 
welfare and security. A corresponding differentiation is noticeable in Treaty law, as well as 
constitutional doctrine and theory. The exact contours of the sectoral constitutions can, though, 
be debatable. Should education be included in the constitutional object of the social constitution? 
Does the constitutional object of the security constitution cover both internal and external 
security? It might also be asked whether the sectoral constitutions should include, say, an 
environmental dimension. The decisive criterion consists of differentiation: arguably, neither 
primary environmental law nor the accompanying constitutional doctrine and theory have reached 
the required level of differentiation.  
The term ‘juridical constitution’ may cause some confusion. All the constitutional dimensions 
possess a legal character in the sense that constitutional law always occupies one of the two poles 
of the constitutional relation; all the constitutional dimensions are about the constitutional relation 
between constitutional law and its constitutional object. What distinguishes the juridical 
constitution is the fact that here both poles of the constitutional relation are legal in nature. In the 
juridical constitution, the law establishes a reflexive relation to itself.  
Thus, distinct dimensions can be discerned in the European constitution. Yet, their 
distinctness is not absolute but they enter into specific relations with each other. The very term 
‘framing constitutions’ implies such inter-relationality. How, exactly, do the political and 
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juridical constitutions frame the sectoral ones? Put briefly, the political constitution provides the 
institutional framework for sectoral constitutionalization, while the juridical constitution offers 
the legal instruments. The political constitution regulates the EU institutions to which sectoral 
competences are granted: such as the European Council, the European Parliament, the Council of 
Ministers, the Commission and the ECJ. At the individual pole of the polity relationship, the 
political constitution establishes and defines European citizenship, with potential implications in 
all sectoral dimensions. Correspondingly, sectoral constitutional dimensions rely on the 
legislative and judicial instruments, institutions and procedures provided by the juridical 
constitution. Moreover, the general principles developed in the course of juridical 
constitutionalization, such as direct effect, supremacy, the rule of law and fundamental rights, are 
pertinent in all sectoral dimensions. The framing constitutions exercise both a constitutive and a 
restrictive function with regard to the sectoral constitutions. 
All the sectoral constitutions possess distinct political and juridical features as well: they have 
their characteristic institutional structures and legal particularities. The economic constitution 
cannot be examined without including the role of the Commission as the European Competition 
Authority or – after Maastricht – the ECB as the executor of European monetary policy. 
Correspondingly, in addition to general EU legal instruments sectoral constitutions have resorted 
to particular means, too, such as the Maastricht Social policy Protocol and Agreement in the social 
dimension or framework decisions in the security constitution. Institutional or juridical 
particularities should be discussed in the context of sectoral constitutionalization. But they should 
also be conceived of as elements in the overall European political and juridical constitutions. The 
political and juridical constitutions do not merely facilitate sectoral constitutionalization. They 
also react to and summarize its implications and consequences. In this sense the political and 
juridical constitutions are not only framing but also summarizing constitutions. 
In a way, the EU reverses the relationship between the political and juridical constitutions and 
the sectoral policy fields to which we are accustomed at the state level. A state constitution is 
usually equated with the political and juridical dimensions which, according to the traditional 
understanding, establish the political and legislative sovereignty of the state. In turn, sectoral 
policies result from the exercise of this sovereignty. The political and juridical constitutions are 
primary in relation to sectoral policy fields which, as a rule, do not enjoy constitutional dignity. 
In a policy-oriented transnational polity and legal system, such as the EU, the claim to authority 
is substantively (functionally) limited. Juridical and political constitutionalization are not ends in 
themselves but largely respond to the needs and implications of sectoral constitutionalization. 
Economic constitutionalization would not have been possible without simultaneous juridical 
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constitutionalization, which for instance produced the crucial principles of direct effect and 
primacy. Sectoral constitutionalization displays both formal and substantive aspects; by and large, 
the formal aspect of sectoral constitutionalization coincides with juridical constitutionalization. 
In turn, the Maastricht Treaty, which for instance reinforced the position of the European 
Parliament and introduced European citizenship, signified a leap in political constitutionalization. 
An important backdrop to this leap consisted of the legitimacy deficit which was perceived to 
have ensued from the preceding economic constitutionalization driven by the ECJ. In the 
European constitution, too, the framing political and juridical dimensions enjoy constitutive 
primacy. But they are subjected to the functional primacy of sectoral constitutions. The 
relationship between framing and sectoral constitutions is recursive: through their functional 
primacy sectoral constitutions trigger juridical and political constitutionalization, the results of 
which will then be available for subsequent framing purposes.  
European integration has primarily been an economic project, and in spite of the expansion 
of EU activities into new policy domains, economic integration still retains a dominant position. 
This has left its imprint on inter-dimensional relations within the European constitution. The 
economic constitution has benefited from a functional primacy with regard not only to the framing 
constitutions but other sectoral constitutions as well. The functional primacy of the economic 
constitution can be observed not only in juridical constitutionalization but in the emergence and 
further development of non-economic sectoral constitutions, too. The social policy provisions of 
the Treaty of Rome had an economic rationale: they served free movement of workers or securing 
a level playing field for the industries of different Member States. In turn, the origins of the 
security dimension lie in the consequences of opening internal Community borders in order to 
implement free movement of workers, which is an essential element of the economic constitution. 
The functional primacy of the economic constitution has also limited the developmental options 
of the non-economic constitutions, as can be seen in the subjection of healthcare and social 
security to free movement and competition law.  
Still, the functional primacy of the European economic constitution should not be understood 
in absolute terms. Although owing their initial momentum to the economic constitution, in their 
further development non-economic constitutional dimensions may have obtained at least partial 
independence from economic considerations. The original institutional organization of the 
Community – the nascent institutional pole of the European polity – was largely tailored to the 
needs of the economic constitution, but subsequently, say in and since Maastricht, specific 
political values, such as democracy and transparency, have gained in importance in political 
constitutionalization. In the security dimension, the scope of the risks to which the security 
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constitution responds has expanded and transcends those deriving from the opening of internal 
borders. Similar signs of independence – or at least striving for independence – are detectable in 
the social constitution, too. A model example of growing autonomy is offered by the way the 
Treaty provision on equal pay was progressively detached from its economic rationale and turned 
into a nucleus of EU antidiscrimination law. The gradual development of constitutional social 
rights also reflects an aspiration for independence, although cross-border social rights in particular 
owe much of their initial dynamics to the implications of the economic constitution. Free 
movement of workers has provided the impetus to the right to cross-border social security and 
free movement of services to the right to cross-border healthcare. 
The at least partial independence of the social constitution points to yet another type of relations 
between constitutional dimensions: relations of conflict. Increasing autonomy may lead to 
normative results which contradict the requirements of the economic constitution. The normative 
implications of the economic constitution may clash with those of, say, the political or social one. 
Before the ECJ, such constitutional conflicts often assume the guise of a contestation between 
different types of rights. Economic rights derived from free movement law may clash with social 
rights, or civil or political fundamental rights. In a standard constellation before the ECJ, the issue 
is whether protection of other types of rights justifies derogating from economic rights; reference 
can be made to such celebrated rulings of the ECJ as Omega, Schmidberger, Viking and Laval.14 
The functional primacy of the economic constitution is obvious in the very posing of the issue: in 
conflicts of rights, what needs justification is restricting not a fundamental right but an economic 
right. Yet, as Omega and Schmidberger demonstrate, functional primacy does not necessarily 
dictate the result of the balancing exercise.  
Economic rights possess an instrumental character; they serve the basic policy objective of 
establishing and securing the functioning of the common (internal) market. The conflictual 
relations between the economic and the political or social constitutions can often be 
conceptualized as a tension between policy-oriented economic rights and principle-based 
fundamental rights. The above-mentioned landmark cases also point to an aspect of conflict 
resolution in the framing function of the juridical constitution. The juridical constitution may be 
called upon to resolve inter-dimensional constitutional conflicts.  
																																																						
14 Case C-36/02 Omega Spielhallen [2004] ECR I-9609; Case C-112/00 Schmidberger [2003] ECR I-5659; Case C-
438/05 International Transport Workers’ Federation and Finnish Seamen’s Union [2007] ECR I-10779; Case C-341/05 
Laval un Partneri [2007] ECR I-11767. 
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Constitutionalism is not only about surface-level constitutional law, enshrined in 
constitutional provisions and precedents. It is also about the constitutional culture animating 
constitutional practices, informing the Vorverständnis of constitutional actors and acting as a filter 
through which surface-level constitutional material is approached. As the Treaties 
constitutionalize sectoral policy areas and objectives, they also constitutionalize disagreements 
on the background assumptions of sectoral policies. In sectoral constitutionalization, European 
constitutionalism has not been able to draw on Member State constitutional traditions, and the 
contestedness of the theoretical underpinnings has delayed development of a distinct 
constitutional culture, impregnating the Vorverständnis of European constitutional actors.  
 In accordance with the basic teleological nature of the EU, the constitutional theories 
which in the diverse sectoral dimensions have created coherence in EU constitution have been 
policy-oriented. However, policy issues are controversial issues, and the constitutional theories 
underlying constitutional law have been subject to contestation, too. Examination of sectoral 
constitutionalization shows how controversial are constitutional theories in the various 
dimensions. Within the microeconomic constitution, the main frontline separates advocates of 
market liberalization from those who accept the possibility and need of national or European 
public regulation; within the macroeconomic constitution Monetarists have been confident of 
EMU becoming an optimal currency area while Economists have stressed the necessity of 
common economic policies as a precondition for common monetary policy; within the social 
constitution the primacy of national welfare regimes collides with the prevalence of the economic 
constitution, and national solidaristic justice confronts European access justice; and, finally, 
within the security constitution, security and fundamental rights considerations clash with each 
other, as does transnationalism with state-sovereigntism and intergovernmentalism. 
 
3. The evolutionary nature of the European constitution 
 
State constitutions are usually examined as unitary normative entities, the tacit assumption being 
that juridical and political constitutions emerge and develop parallel to each other. By contrast, 
the multidimensional European constitution has resulted from a differentiated process, displaying 
diverse temporalities. The European constitutional dimensions have not appeared simultaneously 
but, rather, successively. Nor have they followed exactly the same developmental path. Typical 
of European constitutionalism is – to borrow Ernst Bloch’s expression – Gleichzeitigkeit des 
Ungleichzeitigen.  
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The upsurge of theoretical interest in European constitutionalism has involved efforts to apply 
to the European context the tripartite conceptual cluster of constituent power (pouvoir constituant), 
demos as the subject of this power and constitutional moment as the instance when this power is 
wielded. These efforts have not been particularly successful. The elevation of ‘constituent power’ to 
a central constitutional concept has led Dieter Grimm to denigrate the Treaties to a quasi-constitution. 
Conceptual dilution is an alternative consequence of clinging to concepts coined in a specific branch 
of constitutional culture: revolutionary American and French constitutionalism. We have drifted far 
from the original conceptual connotations if we define the Member States as Masters of the Treaties 
(Herren der Verträge) as a European demos or their treaty making power as a pouvoir constituant the 
exercise of which has produced the European constitution. The concepts of revolutionary 
constitutionalism are not applicable to the European constitution, which has not resulted from the 
exercise of constituent power by a European demos at an identifiable constitutional moment.  
Instead of a revolutionary break, the many constitutions of Europe are a continuously evolving 
outcome of an ongoing process. This process does include such high-profile occasions as agreements 
on new Treaties and Treaty amendments, but to label these as constitutional moments is rather far-
fetched. Furthermore, they do not exhaust the process of constitutionalization. Even more fanciful 
would be employ concepts of the revolutionary constitutional tradition in the context of landmark 
decisions by the ECJ, such as van Gen den Loos and Costa v Enel; decisions which were crucial for 
juridical constitutionalization but whose constitutional significance was, outside of a narrow circle of 
initiates, realized only long afterwards. Instead of the cluster of revolutionary-tuned concepts of 
constituent power, demos and constitutional moment, the European constitution(s) should be 
examined through the evolutionary concept of constitutionalization, as a multidimensional and 
multitemporal process of constitutionalization. In the European context, ‘constitutionalization’ 
simply refers to the gradual, incremental development of the European constitution in its various 
dimensions and by various constitutional actors; not only by the Member States as a constitutional 
legislator but also the ECJ as a constitutional court, assisted by European law scholars.  
Distinct periods can be discerned in European constitutionalization. These receive their 
particular colouring from a particular constitution; a pacemaker constitution, as it were. Reflecting 
the temporal and functional primacy of economic integration, the first wave, initiated by the Treaty 
of Rome, or even earlier by the Treaty of Paris (1951) establishing the European Coal and Steel 
Community (ECSC), proceeded under the auspices of the economic constitution. The rulings of the 
ECJ defining the basic principles characterizing Community law as an independent legal system 
manifested the significance of the juridical constitution: juridical and economic constitutionalization 
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proceeded in tandem. The Maastricht Treaty epitomized the at least temporary dominance of the 
political constitution. In turn, the Amsterdam Treaty (1998), with its new provisions on the Area of 
Freedom, Security and Justice, inaugurated the prominence of the security constitution, which was 
further reinforced by European reactions to 9/11. Subsequently, the Eurozone crisis catapulted the 
economic constitution back to the pacemaker role. However, if the emphasis in the Rome Treaty and 
the succeeding case law of the ECJ lay on the microeconomic constitution, the crisis highlighted the 
role of the macroeconomic layer. The pacemaker role of the macroeconomic constitution entailed 
that the constitutional mutation launched by the Eurozone crisis was not restricted to the economic 
aspect. It extended to the political and social dimensions as well; it also affected democracy and 
transparency, as well as social values and rights. Finally, the immigration crisis which broke out in 
2015 and the vote for Brexit in June 2016 shifted the emphasis to, respectively, the security and the 
political dimension. 
Related to ‘constitutionalization’, other process-oriented concepts are of particular relevance 
for European constitutional analysis. These include ‘transnationalization’ and ‘individualization’. In 
important respects, constitutionalization has signified transnationalization: superseding 
intergovernmental institutional and decision-making structures, typical of international organizations, 
as well as detaching European law from the international law background. However, when examining 
European constitutionalization ‘transnational’ and ‘intergovernmental’ should not be 
straightforwardly opposed. In the institutional organization of the EU, the Commission, the ECJ and 
the European Parliament make up the transnational core. But even the European Council and the 
Council of Ministers are institutions of a transnational polity, and the transnational setting leaves its 
imprint on institutions with an intergovernmental composition, too. In turn, the Treaties still possess 
the dual character of “a constitutional charter” and an agreement under international law. Moreover, 
in both the social and security dimensions, international law agreements have played an important 
role as precursors to constitutionalization through Treaty provisions. In combating the Eurozone 
crisis, Member States resorted to agreements under international law as an alternative to primary or 
secondary Union law. The third-Pillar Treaty provisions in force from 1993 to 2009 even explicitly 
constitutionalized international law conventions as an EU legal instrument.  
Constitutionalization has implied individualization: establishment of direct links between 
European institutions and European citizens in their diverse attires. From the perspective of European 
individuals, the multidimensional process of constitutionalization has involved a gradual enrichment 
of European citizenship, adding successive layers to the initial market citizenship of the economic 
constitution: the judicial citizenship of the juridical constitution; the social citizenship of the social 
constitution; and finally the political citizenship which grants individuals not only the specific 
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citizenship rights of the Treaty but European fundamental rights as well. Still, European citizens also 
remain citizens of Member States, and the relations between European institutions and individual 
citizens hint at the relevance of the Member State level, too. 
In sum, ‘constitutionalization’ is an evolutionary alternative to the revolutionary concepts of 
pouvoir constituant, demos and constitutional moment. Particular relations exist among the 
constitutional dimensions, such as the functional – and temporal – primacy of the economic 
constitution and the general functional primacy of sectoral constitutionalization in respect of the 
framing juridical and political constitutionalization. Such relations hint at a particular internal logic 
guiding European constitutionalization. Still, it is important to stress that European 
constitutionalization should not be reconstructed as a closed, linear and pre-determined evolutionary 
process. Different constitutions may well clash with each other, and constitutional backlashes form 
part of the picture as well. And even more crucially, we should always bear in mind that the ultimate 
factors accelerating or impeding constitutionalization are of an extra-legal and extra-constitutional, 
economic, political and ideological, nature. These factors may include high-profile, even crisis-like 
events, such as the fall of the Berlin wall and the reunification of Germany (the Maastricht Treaty as 
a high-point of political constitutionalization); 9/11 (acceleration of the development of the security 
constitution); the global financial crisis which in the autumn of 2008 broke out following the collapse 
of Lehman Brothers (the teetering of the Maastricht principles of the European economic 
constitution); the eruption of the migration crisis in the winter 2015-2016 or the Brexit referendum 
in 2016. Still, equally well constitutionalization may be influenced by contingent events which on 
their occurrence have aroused no public attention but which have, for instance, produced 
constitutionally relevant case law of the ECJ.  
 
4. Transnational and national constitutionalism 
4.1. Constitutional pluralism and federal constitutionalism 
 
During the last twenty years, constitutional pluralism has largely dominated scholarly discussion on 
the relations between the European constitution and its national counterparts. The debate does address 
an important aspect in the relations that the European transnational constitution entertains with 
Member State national constitutions: the overlapping and rival claims of authority that these 
constitutions raise. Indeed, the very concept of legal or constitutional pluralism can be defined as a 
constellation where two legal regimes raise such overlapping and conflicting claims of authority. 
Pluralist constellations are typical of our age of postnational law. Conflicts of authority seem to be 
inevitable between transnational law, such as EU law, and national law, such as Member State law. 
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Transnational and national law follow different principles of authority; the scope of their authority is 
circumscribed through different criteria. National law adheres to the territorial principle of authority 
and claims universal jurisdiction in in its territory. By contrast, transnational law’s claim of authority 
is substantially or functionally defined and limited. Territorial and functional principles of authority 
are bound to clash, producing at regular intervals fundamental conflicts of authority; that is, conflicts 
turning on the autonomy and identity of the colliding legal regimes. The celebrated cases involving 
the German Constitutional Court and the Luxembourg Court – the OMT case15 is the latest but will 
not remainthe last example – intimate how high the stakes are: the German Constitutional Court sees 
itself as the guardian of German constitutional identity and the autonomy of German law, while the 
ECJ defends the autonomy and constitutional identity of EU law. Such fundamental conflicts of 
authority are widely different from the border skirmishes that are addressed by private international 
law or, as the Anglo-American term goes, conflict of laws. However, the exchange of arguments 
between the German Constitutional Court and the Luxembourg Court in, for instance, the OMT case 
not only shows the inevitability of fundamental conflicts of authority under the pluralism of 
postnational law. It also testifies to the possibility of a dialogical resolution or, at least, pacification 
of these conflicts. The relationship between the function-specific EU constitution and universalist 
Member State constitutions is not labelled only by actual or latent conflicts. It is also marked by 
dialogue and co-operation, facilitated by a shared constitutional deep culture; in brief, by normative 
and institutional interlegality.  
 In addition to its conflictual focus, the debate on constitutional pluralism has been one-
sided in another respect, too. It has addressed the consequences of the overlap of national and 
transnational claims of authority merely in the juridical and political dimensions. However, Member 
States’ defence of their political and legislative sovereignty – the universality of their political and 
legal claims to authority – has had implications for European sectoral constitutions, too. Member 
States have raised sovereignty concerns vis-à-vis EU action with regard to fiscal and other economic 
policy; welfare policy and the choice of welfare regimes; and use of the coercive power of the state, 
the state’s “monopoly of legitimate use of violence”. 
In fundamental conflicts of authority, typical of the pluralist constellation, each party – 
say, the ECJ and a national constitutional court – approaches the issue from the perspective of its 
referential legal order – say, EU law and the national legal order, respectively. Perspectivism of legal 
orders is inevitable. As constitutional pluralists have emphasized, no second-order legal principle or 
																																																						
15 The contributions of the German Constitutional Court are Beschluss vom 06. Juli 2014 -  2 BvR 2728/13 and Urteil 
vom 21. Juni 2016 - 2 BvR 2728/13, and the ECJ interventions Opinion of Advocate General Cruz Villalón delivered 
on 14 January 2015, C-62/14 - Gauweiler and Others  and C-62/14 - Gauweiler and Others. 
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neutral arbiter exists to resolve the conflict. In this sense, the conflicts are undecidable. This 
observation has been picked up by theorists of federal constitutionalism, such as Robert Schütze, and 
related to notion of Staatenverbund or – in Schütze’s translation – federal union. What is considered 
characteristic of a federal union is the very undecidability of fundamental conflicts of authority 
(sovereignty). If such conflicts were to be resolved in favour of the union, it would develop into a 
federal state; if, in turn, in favour of the states, the union would be degraded to the status of an 
international organization.16 In line with the debate on constitutional pluralism, federal 
constitutionalism points to an important aspect in the relationship of European and Member state 
constitutionalism. However, it also shares the one-sided conflictual focus and the reduction of the 
European constitution to its juridical and political dimensions. 
 
4.2. Relations of complementarity  
 
The conflict-oriented view of constitutional pluralism tends to obscure another, equally important 
aspect in the relationship between the transnational European constitution and the national Member 
State constitutions: complementarity. Treaty provisions on the respective competences of the Union 
and the Member States may be read to imply a division of labour, based on a relationship of 
complementarity. Yet this can be an erroneous reading. Complementarity in the sense of division of 
labour presupposes common objectives; only with regard to common objectives can an expedient 
division of labour and corresponding allocation of competences be adopted. But division of 
competences, such as it is enshrined in the Treaty on the European Union, does not necessarily imply 
a division of labour: division of competences may free the Union and Member States to pursue their 
distinct objectives and policies within their fields of competence. It is misleading to assume that the 
Union and its Member States constitute in every relevant respect a multilevel Verfassungsbund where 
relations between the transnational and the national are primarily characterized by intertwinement 
and complementarity.17 In the field of shared competences, the principle of subsidiarity, as formulated 
in Art. 5(3) TEU, does presuppose the existence of common objectives; the Union will step in only 
if the objective at issue cannot be better achieved by lower-level action. A presumption of common 
objectives, grounded in a common value basis whose existence Art. 2 TEU postulates, also facilitates 
an understanding of the demarcation between national and Union fundamental rights review in terms 
of complementarity. 
																																																						
16 R. Schütze (2014). 
17 The idea of a multilevel Verfassungsverbund was propounded, first of all, by Ingolf Pernice. See, e.g., I. Pernice  (2009).  
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All the sectoral European constitutions imply relations of complementarity. Take the economic 
constitution. EU constitutional law does not comprise all the constitutional guarantees which must be 
in place to enable a European internal market, based on undistorted competition. The fundamental 
rights that a market economy requires are mainly ensured by national constitutions; by national 
constitutional provisions on the right to property, freedom of contract and freedom of trade. Hence, 
the European microeconomic constitution, covering primarily the fundamental market freedoms and 
competition law, is premised on the complementary contribution of Member State constitutions. In 
turn, the European macroeconomic constitution has presupposed, say, Member State financial and 
economic policy autonomy, although its use has been subjected to European constraints. In the social 
dimension, the European constitution has relied on the existence of national redistributive welfare 
regimes. Finally, in the security dimension, too, core security functions and their judicial supervision 
have been retained under Member State sovereignty and taken by the European security constitutions 
as a given premise.  
The relation of complementarity is also conspicuous in the field of citizenship, which brings us 
to the dimension of the political constitution. European citizenship builds on national citizenship, and 
not only in the sense of the identification of individual citizens – by definition, Member State citizens 
are also EU citizens. Complementarity labels the participatory rights of European citizens as well. In 
their EU constitutional practices, in debating EU issues and in participating in the European public 
sphere, EU citizens rely on the public autonomy guaranteed to them as Member State citizens; the 
freedoms of assembly, association and the press enshrined in national constitutions. And if we in 
general can speak of European citizenship in collective terms, as European citizenry, this collective 
political subject can only exist as a result of the networking of national citizenries and national public 
spheres.  
 
4.3. Two-stage legitimation 
 
Opting for thin notions of constitution and constitutionalism does not imply denying the relevance 
for European constitutionalism of the normative ideas of a constitutional democracy (a democratic 
Rechtsstaat) or the conception of legitimacy it implies. However, efforts to secure democratic 
constitutional legitimacy should be examined through the interaction between transnational and 
national constitutionalism. As an epitome of transnational constitutionalism European 
constitutionalism has been, and still is, in some vital respects, parasitic on Member State national 
constitutionalism. This also holds for constitutional and democratic legitimacy, where the 
complementary relationship between national and transnational constitutionalism – alongside with its 
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process-like and multi-dimensional character the third distinctive feature of European 
constitutionalism – is particularly important.  
Paradoxically, perhaps, the Treaties owe their original constitutional legitimacy to their 
international law aspect, to the fact that they have been ratified by national parliaments or in 
referendums, in accordance with the provisions of the national constitution. However, the initial 
legitimacy which the EU may derive from Member States’ acting as Masters of the Treaties does not 
suffice. The claim to legitimacy must be constantly re-redeemed. This concerns both system 
legitimacy – the overall legitimacy of the EU – and the policy legitimacy of individual policies and 
institutions responsible for these. Let us rely on Fritz Scharpf’s distinction between democratic input 
legitimacy and result-based output legitimacy.18 In state constitutions, provisions on legislative and 
budgetary procedures, as well as participatory citizenship rights, aim to produce democratic input 
legitimacy at both system and policy level. In turn, provisions on independent expert bodies, such as 
courts or central banks, seek to facilitate output legitimacy in terms of, say, impartial and reasoned 
adjudication or monetary policy objectives, such as monetary stability.  
At the European level, the distinction between system and policy legitimacy has not been very 
sharp. Especially in the early, pre-Maastricht decades, European integration as a whole could be 
understood as a cluster of specific policies19 and assessed in terms of output legitimacy. Bracketing 
the second-order objective of maintaining peace in Europe, what was decisive was whether the 
promise of increased economic prosperity (re)distributed through national mechanisms was kept or 
not. However, enlargement of European competences through ECJ case law and the prominent role 
of the ECJ in European law- and constitution-making in general raised concerns about the need for 
democratic input legitimacy. The boost to political constitutionalization in Maastricht responded to 
these concerns. 
Reflecting the initial technocratic policy orientation of European integration, prominent in, 
for instance, Jean Monnet’s functionalism, the Treaty of Rome largely ignored the issue of democratic 
legitimacy. The Member States ratified the Treaties according to their constitutional requirements, 
and the democratic legitimacy this produced was considered sufficient. However, embryos of 
democratic legitimation of European policy-making, too, were inserted even in the Treaty of Rome 
through the Council and the Assembly (European Parliament). These embryos manifested the two-
stage mechanism of democratic legitimacy which is such a distinct feature of European 
constitutionalism and the significance of which has grown in line with the widening of European 
																																																						
18 F. Scharpf (1999), pp. 6-8.  
19 Such an understanding was implicit in Hans Peter Ipsen’s often-cited characterization of the European Communities 
as Zweckverbände funktioneller Integration. H. P. Ipsen (1972). 
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competences. The contribution of national democratic procedures to the legitimacy of European 
policies is a vital epitome of the complementary relation between national and European 
constitutionalism. Peter Lindseth’s administrative law portrayal of the EU not only ignores sectoral 
constitutionalization. From its exclusive Member State perspective, it also refuses to examine 
European constitutionalism through interaction between the transnational and national levels, and 
declines to place national democratic procedures of control, oversight and implementation in the 
context of European constitutionalism.  
In the course of political constitutionalization, efforts have been made to create direct 
legitimating relations between European citizenry and European institutions, most notably through 
direct election of the European Parliament and the introduction of European citizenship. However, as 
the low turnout in European elections has most dramatically proved, the cultural and social 
prerequisites for the formation of a European civil society and public sphere, capable of sustaining a 
Europe-wide democracy, are still largely lacking. On their own, European constitutional practices, 
culminating institutionally in the election of the European Parliament and its legislative and 
supervisory powers, can hardly live up to the high expectations of the thick normative concept of 
constitutionalism. This has only accentuated the importance of the contribution of national 
constitutionalism to the democratic legitimacy of the EU.  
Intergovernmental EU institutions work under the guidance of national democratically 
legitimated bodies, and national parliaments even participate directly in Union law-making. 
Furthermore, the major part of Union legislative and other measures are implemented and enforced 
by national authorities. EU directives are transposed into the municipal legal order by the national 
legislator, thereby receiving an injection of democratic input legitimacy. Furthermore, nationally 
applicable EU law is integrated into the whole of the national legal order and, as it were, scrounges 
off the general legitimacy of the latter. In Jürgen Habermas’s distinction between regulatory law (law 
as a medium) and law as an institution,20 EU law has mainly fallen into the former category. Law as 
an institution is intimately related to the moral and value texture of society; hence, this department of 
law is vital to the overall substantive legitimacy of the legal order. Insofar as EU law enjoys 
substantive legitimacy, it is at least partly parasitic on the substantive legitimacy of national legal 
orders. In sum, the fact that the general public has primarily confronted EU measures, not directly, 
but indirectly, through the political and administrative institutions and the legal system of the 
																																																						
20 J. Habermas (1989), p. 365. 
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respective Member State, has been crucial for the legitimacy that the Union and its individual policies 
have enjoyed among European citizenry.21  
As Lindseth has shown, Member State parliamentary oversight of European policies has 
intensified during recent decades. Yet, contrary to what Lindseth contends, this is not an argument 
for rejecting the existence of European constitutionalism. The interaction between the transnational 
and national levels belongs to the distinct of European constitutionalism. This interaction is vital for 
providing European institutions and policies with democratic legitimacy. Although this can hardly be 
seen as a decisive argument, it might still be worth mentioning that the Treaty of Lisbon explicitly 
recognizes the role of Member State constitutionalism in realizing the democratic principle. Art. 10 
TEU proclaims that the functioning of the Union is founded on representative democracy. Not only 
are citizens directly represented at Union level in the European Parliament. In addition, Member 
States are represented in the European Council by their heads of state or government and in the 
Council by their governments. In turn, these representatives are themselves democratically 
accountable either to national parliaments or citizens. Art. 10 TEU expressly confirms the 
complementarity of direct European democracy and the two-level mechanism which harnesses 
national procedures to the service of European level democratic legitimacy.22   




21 F. Scharpf (2012), p. 19. 
22 On the specificity of European constitutionalism see also Tuori (2015). 
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